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RECENT DECISIONS
member of a secret organization dedicated to the attainment of unlaw-
ful objectives. 1 3 The underlying theory for this rule is to allow the
jury to draw the inference that since the defendant is a member of
such an organization it is reasonably probable that he would have
a motive or purpose for committing the crime charged, and therefore
the conclusion to be drawn would be that the defendant, with reason-
able probability, was guilty of the crime charged.14
In Wisconsin the general rule of law is followed disallowing evi-
dence of a prior offense by the accused,' 5 ostensively submitted to
show guilt of the crime charged, but such evidence is admissible when
the prior offense directly tends to prove some element of the crime
charged.'6 The test to determine the competency of the evidence was
given in the Spick case where the court said that the trial court must
admit the evidence if (1) the evidence logically and reasonably tends
to prove a fact in issue, and (2) there is a reasonable probability of
the truthfulness of the evidence to be admitted ;17 and the fact that the
evidence is circumstantial,' or may be prejudicial,' 9 is no ground for
its exclusion. If there is a connection between the two acts so as to
show "plan, design and intent! the evidence is admissible.20
In this writer's opinion it would appear that the Wisconsin court,
if confronted with an analogous situation, would follow the principle
of the Spick case2' and would concur with the majority in the instant
case.
FINTAN M. FLANAGAN
Future Interests-Construction of Conveyance to "A and His
Children"-Rule in Wild's Case-Certain land had been deeded by a
grantor to his wife and their children. At the time the deed took effect
the grantor and his wife had five living children, but another child was
subsequently born. After the wife's death, condemnation proceedings
'13 Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 157 Ky. 544, 180 S.W. 961 (1915); Carroll v.
Commonwealth, 84- Pa. 107 (1877); Campbell v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 187
(1877); Hester v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 138 (1877); McManus v. Common-
wealth, 91 Pa. 57 (1879).
-4 Commonwealth v. Fragassa, 278 Pa. 1, 122 A. 88 (1923).
15 Ablricht v. State, 6 Wis. 74 (1857); Schaser v. State, 36 Wis. 429 (1874);
State v. Miller, 47 Wis. 530, 3 N.W. 31 (1879) ; McAllister v. State, 112 Wis.
496, 88 N.W. 212 (1901) ; Malone v. State, 192 Wis. 379, 212 N.W. 879 (1927);
State v. Henger, 220 Wis. 410, 264 N.W. 922 (1936).
16 Zoldoske v. State, 82 Wis. 580, 52 N.W. 778 (1892) ; Fossdahl v. State, 89 Wis.
482, 62 N.W. 185 (1895) ; Paulson v. State, 118 Wis. 89, 94 N.W. 771 (1903) ;
Dietz v. State, 149 Wis. 462, 136 N.W. 166 (1912); Magnuson v. State, 187
Wis. 122, 203 N.W. 749 (1925) ; State v. Meating, 202 Wis. 47, 231 N.W. 263(1930).
17 Spick v. State, 140 Wis. 104, 121 N.W. 664 (1909).
is Ibid.; Schwantes v. State, 127 Wis. 160, 106 N.W. 237 (1906).
'19 Herde v. State, 236 Wis. 408, 295 N.W. 684 (1941).
20 Ibid.
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by the U. S. government to acquire the land were held and a question
arose concerning distribution of the condemnation award. Held: The
conveyance to the grantor's wife and their children created a life ,estate
in the wife with remainder in fee to all children of the grantor and his
wife, both living and afterborn. United States v. 654.8 Acres of.Land
in Roane County, Tenn. et al., 102 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Ten4. 1952).
When a grantor or testator gives property to "A and his children,"
a problem arises as to whether he intended a concurrent or a successive
gift. The 'law regarding such dispositions grew out of Wild's Case, a
famous.English_ decision handed down in 1599.' There are two "resolu-
tions" which stem from this case, one applying where the grantee or
beneficiary has no children when the instrument takes effect, the other
when the grantee or beneficiary has children at that time. Since the
latter situation is ,that of the instant case we are ,concerned only with
the second resolution,- which, in its modern form, is as follows: A de-
vise or conveyance to A and his children, A having children living at
the time, vests the estate in A and his living children as cotenants, to
the exclusion of any children afterward born.2
Although the two resolutions in Wild's Case were pure dicta, they
have been. the basis for countless decisions throughout the years in both
England and America.3 The second resolution is the majority rule in
the United States today.4 However, it is only a rule of construction and
will yield to a contrary intent. Sometimes additional factors showing
such intent indicate use of the world "children" as a word of limitation
rather than a word of purchase, so an estate in fee simple goes to the
named person. 5 Usually, however,. additional factors justify the life
estate and remainder construction.6
In the instant case the apparent result is that such additional factors
call for the life estate and remainder construction. However, the Ten-
nessee court, although paying lip service to the second resolution in
Wild's Case, actually repudiates it. It states that the rule is followed,
but that a slight indication of a variant intent takes a case out' of the
I Wild's Case, 6 Coke 16 b, 77 Eng. Reprint 277 (1599).
2 Porter v. Henderson, 203 Ala. 312, 82 So. 668 (1919) ; Wills v. Foltz, 56 S.E.
473, 61 W. Va. 262, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 283 (1907). For collected cases, see Notes,
161 A.L.R. 612 (1946); L.R.A. 1917 B 49; and L.R.A. 1917 B 76. Also, see
Casner, Construction of Gifts "To A and His Children" (herein the" Rule in
Wild's Case), 7 U. CHI. L. REv. 438 (1940) for an excellent discussion of the
problems involved in the second resolution in Wild's Case.3 3 Powell, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 101 (1952) ; 2 SIMES, THE LAW OF Fu-
TURE INTERESTs 201 (1936).
43 POWELL, ibid., at 103; 2 SIMES, ibid., at 209; Casner, supra, note 2, at 454; and
cases cited.
5 Payne v. Kennay, 151 Va. 472, 145 S.E. 300 (1928).
6 Desmond v. MacNeill, 90 Conn. 142, 96 A. 924 (1916) ; Casner, supra, note 2,
at 456, n.78.
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rule.7 The instant case is a good illustration of the weak excuses which
are used under Tennessee law to controvert the rule. The court says
that because the grantor in the consideration clause said, "for and in
consideration of the love and affection I have for Alice Brooks ... I,
S. M. Brooks doth convey... ," he showed a purpose to favor his wife
by thus singling her out. The court therefore concludes that a life
estate in the wife was intended.8 Similar excuses are used to get around
the rule in other Tennessee cases.9 The Tennessee court does say that
the rule applies in one case, i.e. where a conveyance is to one and his
children without more.'0 However, such a situation is hardly conceiv-
able in view of the way the courts attach importance to seemingly in-
significant phrases, as in the instant case.
The reason for Tennessee's repudiation of the second resolution in
Wild's Case is a belief that it was the intention of the grantor or testator
that afterborn children should share.:" They are excluded if the gift is
immediate, since the class of beneficiaries closes when the gift takes
effect.-2 But under the life estate and remainder construction after-
born children are normally included, since the class can increase during
the life estate in the parent.'3
Two other states, Kentucky and Pennsylvania, also repudiate the
second resolution in Wild's Case, but they do so more affirmatively.
They declare the law to be that a devise or conveyance to A and his
children creates a life estate in A with remainder to the children.1 4 In
both states one of the reasons for adopting the life estate and remainder
construction is the reason advanced in Tennessee, i.e. to allow after-
born children to share.' 5 Kentucky, however, has an additional reason
in the case of a devise to one's wife and children. If the wife were to
7 United States v. 654.8 Acres of Land in Roane County, Tenn. et al., 102 F.
Supp. 937, 940 (E.D. Tenn. 1952) ; Blackburn v. Blackburn, 109 Tenn. 674, 679,
73 S.W. 109, 110 (1902) ; Beecher v. Hicks, 7 Lea 207 (Tenn. 1881).8 United States v. 654.8 Acres of Land in Roane County, Tenn. et al., ibid., 940,
941.
9 Blackburn v. Blackburn, supra, note 7; Beecher v. Hicks, supra, note 7; Moore
v. Simmons, 2 Head 545 (Tenn. 1859).10 United States v. 654.8 Acres of Land in Roane County, Tenn. et al., supra,
note 7; Beecher v. Hicks, ibid.
11 See cases in note 7, supra.
12 Moore v. Ennis, 10 Del. Ch. 170, 87 A. 1009 (1913) ; Biggs v. McCarty, 86 Ind.
352, 44 Am. Rep. 320 (1882); Cullens v. Cullens, 161 N.C. 344, 77 S.E. 228,
L.R.A. 1917 B 74 (1913) ; 2 SimEs, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 214.
13 Ramey v. Ramey, 195 Ky. 673, 243 S.W. 934 (1922) ; Elliot v. Diamond Coal &
Coke Co., 230 Pa. 423, 79 A. 708 (1911) ; Hague v. Hague, 161 Pa. 643, 29 A.
261 (1894) ; 3 POWELL, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 105; Casner, supra, note 2, at
459; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY sec. 295 (1940).14Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Dye, 146 Ky. 519, 142 S.W. 1057 (1912);
Elliot v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., ibid.
15 Forest Oil Co. v. Crawford, 77 Fed. 106 (3d Cir. 1896) ; Hall v. Wright, 121
Ky. 16, 87 S.W. 1129 (1905); Fletcher v. Tyler, 92 Ky. 145, 17 S.W. 282, 36
Am. St. Rep. 584 (1891) ; Webb v. Holmes, 3 B. Mon. 404 (Ky. 1843) ; Elliot
v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., supra, note 13; Vaughn's Estate, 230 Pa. 554, 79
A. 750 (1911) ; Casner, supra, note 2, at 458.
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take a fee simple in part of the land devised, there would be a possibility
that this part would pass to some stranger to the blood of the testator.
The Kentucky court believes that such a result would be contrary to
the testator's intention. 6
In contrast to the above reasons for repudiating the second resolu-
tion in Wild's Case, there are three main reasons advanced for ad-
herence to the rule. They are: (1) such a construction is in conformity
with the plain import of the words ;17 (2) if a life estate and remainder
were intended, it would have been natural and easy to expressly say
so ;"' (3) public policy, favoring the free alienation of land, is against
the life estate and remainder construction. 9
However, because of the importance of effectuating the intent of
the grantor or testator, the life estate and remainder construction ap-
pears to be more reasonable than the concurrent ownership construc-
tion. One ordinarily thinks of parent and children enjoying property
successively and not concurrently. Since the average grantor or testa-
tor probably has this in mind and since he also probably wants to benefit
all of A's children, whenever born, his probable intention is more likely
to be carried out' by the life estate and remainder construction.20
The problem of construction involved in a conveyance or devise to
A and his children has never been before the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Careful drafting of deeds and wills eliminates the problem, but if it ever
does arise, it is suggested that the life estate and remainder construc-
tion be adopted for the reasons given above.
WILLIAm A. GIGURE
Bailments - Effect of Statute Imputing Negligence of Con-
ditional Vendee, Bailee, or Negligence of Agents, Servants or
Employees of said Vendee or Bailee to Conditional Vendor or
Bailor-Plaintiff brought an action against defendant for damages
to plaintiff's automobile which damages resulted from a collision be-
tween defendant's automobile and plaintiff's automobile, the latter being
driven by an employee of plaintiff's bailee. The bailor-bailee relation-
ship arose out of the commonly known "rent-a-car" contract, but it
16 Shelman & Co. v. Livers' Exec'r, 229 Ky. 90, 16 S.W. 2d 800 (1929) ; Lacey's
Exec'r v. Lacey, 170 Ky. 160, 185 S.W. 495 (1916); Davis v. Hardin, 80 Ky.
672 (1880).
1 Moore v. Ennis, supra, note 12. Also, see Note, L.R.A. 1917 B 49, 50, 51.
Is Graham v. Fowler, 13 Serg. & R. 439 (Pa. 1826). Also, see Note, L.R.A. 1917
B 49, 51.
19 Ewing v. Ewing, 198 Miss. 304, 22 So. 2d 225, 227, 228, 161 A.L.R. 606, 610, 611
(1945).
20 Casner, supra, note 2, at 459. The life estate and remainder construction is
embodied in PROPOSD UNIFORM PROPERTY ACT SEC. 13. However, the RESTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY sec. 283 (a) (1940) follows the second resolution in Wild's
Case.
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